Check a document before you send it. Your file never leaves this tab.
People attach files all day without ever looking inside them. A PDF names the
software and the operating system that made it, and stamps itself with a
timezone. A Word document keeps who last saved it, how long it was worked on,
usually the company name, and — routinely — tracked changes and
comments that were never accepted or deleted, only hidden from view.
The one that has ended careers: text you cannot see but anyone can copy.
Drawing a black rectangle over a name does not remove it. Setting text to white
on a white page does not remove it. Putting a picture on top of it does not
remove it. In all three cases the words are still in the file, and they come
straight out of a copy-paste. Governments, law firms and newspapers have been
publishing documents like this for twenty years.
So this renders every page and, for each piece of text the file will hand over,
asks a simple question: can you actually see it? Text that is present
but invisible is text somebody believed they had removed. That catches all three
tricks at once, without needing to know which one was used.
1. Open a file
Drop a PDF, .docx, .xlsx or .pptx here, or click to chooseNothing is uploaded — it is opened inside this tab
2. What it found
Checks that came back clean
The honest notes
Nothing is uploaded. Static page, no endpoint, no account. A tool that checks your document for leaks and then uploads your document would be a poor joke.
Finding nothing is not a guarantee. This checks the things that leak in practice, and it lists exactly which checks it ran. It cannot promise a file is safe — no tool can — only tell you what it looked for and what it saw.
The invisible-text check works from the rendered page. Every piece of extractable text is compared against the pixels where it should appear. Nearly-flat pixels mean nothing is visible there. That is why it catches black boxes, white-on-white and covered-by-image alike — but it means a page it cannot render is a page it cannot check.
It errs towards silence. The threshold is set well clear of ordinary text, because a tool that flags every normal document is one you learn to ignore. Very small or very faint text could in principle slip past.
Metadata is not always bad. A creation date on a public report is fine. The point is knowing it is there before you decide.
To fix what it finds: delete text properly with the PDF editor, which removes the instruction that drew it rather than covering it over. For Office files, accept or reject tracked changes and delete comments in Word before sending.